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Abstract. Mechanistic explanations satisfy widely held norms of explanation: the ability to 
control and answer counterfactual questions about the explanandum. A currently debated 
issue is whether any non-mechanistic explanations can satisfy these explanatory norms. 
Weiskopf (2011) argues that the models of object recognition and categorization, JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, are not mechanistic, yet satisfy these norms of explanation. In this 
paper I will argue that these models are sketches of mechanisms. My argument will make use 
of model-based fMRI, a novel neuroimaging approach whose significance for current debates 
on psychological models and mechanistic explanation has yet to be explored. 
 











1. Introduction  
 A mechanistic explanation explains a phenomenon by describing the entities, 
activities, and organization of the mechanism that produces, underlies, or maintains the 
phenomenon (see, e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005). Mechanistic explanations satisfy 
what are widely considered normative constraints of explanation: the ability to answer a 
range of counterfactual questions regarding the explanandum phenomenon and the ability to 
manipulate and control the explanandum phenomenon (Craver 2007). A currently debated 
issue is whether any non-mechanistic forms of explanation can satisfy these explanatory 
norms.1 Weiskopf (2011) argues that the models of object recognition and categorization, 
JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, are not mechanistic, yet satisfy these norms of explanation. 
They are not mechanistic, Weiskopf argues, because their parts cannot be neatly localized 
and they sometimes contain components that could never correspond to anything in the brain.  
In this paper, in part using recent model-based fMRI research, I will argue that JIM, 
SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE are in fact mechanism-sketches, i.e. incomplete mechanistic 
explanations. Model-based approaches to neuroimaging allow cognitive neuroscientists to 
locate the distributed neural components of psychological models. These novel neuroimaging 
approaches have developed only recently and philosophers have yet to discuss their 
significance for current debates on psychological models and mechanistic explanation. The 
                                                 
1 A recent paper arguing affirmatively is Barberis (2013). 
  
opportunity to demonstrate this significance is one advantage of responding to Weiskopf 
(2011) in particular.  
 The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I will motivate the mechanistic 
account of explanation and introduce the crucial concept of a mechanism-sketch. I will also 
introduce the model-mechanism-mapping (3M) constraint, which I use as a criterion for 
when a model is mechanistic. In Section 3, I will show that one of the models of object 
recognition and categorization (JIM) that Weiskopf presents as non-mechanistic, yet 
explanatory, is actually a mechanism-sketch. In Section 4, I will introduce model-based 
fMRI, which is required for the argument of the next section. In Section 5, I will use recent 
model-based fMRI research to show that the two other models that Weiskopf presents as non-
mechanistic, yet explanatory (SUSTAIN and ALCOVE), are also mechanism-sketches.  
2. Mechanistic Explanation 
 Salmon (1984) developed the causal-mechanical account of explanation primarily in 
response to the covering-law or deductive-nomological model of explanation (Hempel and 
Oppenheim 1948). According to the deductive-nomological model, an explanation is an 
argument with descriptions of at least one law of nature and antecedent conditions as 
premises and a description of the explanandum phenomenon as the conclusion. On this view, 
explanation is showing that the explanandum phenomenon is predictable given at least one 
law of nature and certain specific antecedent and boundary conditions. However, tying 
explanation this closely to prediction generates some famous problems for the covering-law 
model (see section 2.3 of Salmon [1989] for a review of these problems). On such a view, 
  
many mere correlations come out as explanatory. For example, a falling barometer reliably 
predicts the weather but the falling barometer does not explain the weather. In contrast, on 
the causal-mechanical view, explanation involves situating the explanandum phenomenon in 
the causal structure of the world. There are many ways of situating a phenomenon in the 
causal structure of the world and in this paper I am solely concerned with explanations that 
identify the mechanism that produces, underlies, or maintains the explanandum 
phenomenon.2 
 Within the mechanistic framework there is an important distinction between complete 
mechanistic models and mechanism-sketches (Craver 2007). Mechanism-sketches are 
incomplete descriptions of mechanisms that may contain black boxes and filler terms (Ibid., 
113). Mechanistic models rest on a continuum of more-or-less complete (114). As more 
details are incorporated into the model, the more complete it becomes – though no model is 
ever fully complete, just complete enough for practical purposes. A more complete model is 
not necessarily a better or more useful model. There can certainly be too many details for the 
purposes of the modeler. Idealization can be readily accommodated within a mechanistic 
framework. 
                                                 
2 Other ways of causally situating a phenomenon include etiologically and contextually situating 
it. See Bechtel (2009) for a discussion of some of these different forms of causal explanation. 
What Bechtel calls “looking down” I am here calling “mechanistic explanation.” 
  
 A way of distinguishing mechanistic from non-mechanistic explanation is needed 
before we can assess whether or not any particular explanation is mechanistic. An account 
that can provide an intuitive distinction between mechanistic and non-mechanistic 
explanation is given by Kaplan’s model-mechanism-mapping (3M) constraint (2011). 
According to 3M: 
A model of a target phenomenon explains that phenomenon to the extent that (a) the 
 variables in the model correspond3 to identifiable components, activities, and 
organizational features of the target mechanism that produces, maintains, or underlies 
the phenomenon, and (b) the (perhaps mathematical) dependencies posited among 
these (perhaps mathematical) variables in the model correspond to causal relations 
among the components of the target mechanism. (Kaplan 2011, 347) 
We wanted some criteria to describe when exactly an explanation counts as mechanistic. 3M 
appears to give us something different – criteria which describe when a model explains. I 
think it is best to read 3M as providing criteria both for when a model counts as explanatory 
and for when it counts as mechanistic. 3M can be read as saying that a model of a target 
                                                 
3Batterman and Rice (2014) object that “correspondence” is left unanalyzed by mechanists. 
For the purposes of this paper, how exactly a model corresponds to reality will be clear. For 
example, in my model-based fMRI example correspondence between model and world is 
cashed out in terms of correlation between model-predicted and observed hemodynamic 
response functions. 
  
phenomenon explains that phenomenon to the extent that the model is mechanistic and the 
model is mechanistic to the extent that (a) and (b) are satisfied. It is a more formal way of 
saying in model terms that an explanation is mechanistic to the extent that it accurately 
represents the mechanism underlying the explanandum. I will use 3M only to provide criteria 
that describe when a model counts as mechanistic. I do not want to say that only mechanistic 
models are explanatory (or that the only genuine explanations are mechanistic). As I 
mentioned above, there are other ways of situating an explanandum phenomenon in the 
causal structure of the world that are not mechanistic.4 
On the 3M constraint, the continuum from mechanism-sketch to complete 
mechanistic model runs parallel to the continuum from less to more correspondence between 
the model's variables and dependencies and the world’s (perhaps distributed) parts and causal 
relations.   
3. JIM as a Mechanism-Sketch 
 In this section I examine a model of object recognition and categorization, JIM, that 
Weiskopf (2011) takes to be non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. I will argue that, given the 3M 
constraint, JIM is in fact a mechanism-sketch. The other two models, SUSTAIN and 
ALCOVE, will be examined later in Section 5 after introducing model-based fMRI. I delay 
                                                 
4 I do not mean to imply that Kaplan would disagree. He presented the 3M constraint in the 
context of computational models in neuroscience, so he was not concerned with other 
forms of causal explanation. 
  
further examination of SUSTAIN and ALCOVE until after I introduce model-based fMRI 
because both of these models have been investigated using model-based fMRI and I will 
draw on those investigations to support my claim that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are 
mechanism-sketches. 
 According to JIM, in perception objects are broken down into viewpoint-invariant 
primitives called “geons”. These geons are simple three-dimensional shapes such as cones, 
bricks, and cylinders. The properties of geons are intended to be non-accidental properties 
(NAPs), largely unaffected by rotation in depth (Biederman 2000). The geon structure of 
perceived objects is extracted and stored in memory for later use in comparison and 
classification. 
 The importance of NAPs is shown by the fact that sequential matching tasks are 
extremely easy when stimuli only differ in NAPs. If you are shown a stimulus, then a series 
of other, rotated stimuli, each of which differs from the first only in NAPs, it is a simple 
matter to judge which stimuli are the same as or different than the first. Sequential matching 
tasks with objects that differ in properties that are affected by rotation are much harder. 
 In JIM, this object recognition process is modeled by a seven layer neural network 
(Biederman, Cooper, and Fiser 1993). Layer 1 extracts image edges from an input of a line 
drawing that represents the orientation and depth of an object (182). Layer 2 has three 
components which represent vertices, axes, and blobs. Layer 3 represents geon attributes 
such as size, orientation, and aspect ratio. Layers 4 and 5 both derive invariant relations from 
the extracted geon attributes. Layer 6 receives inputs from layers 3 and 5 and assembles geon 
  
features, e.g., “slightly elongated, vertical cone above, perpendicular to and smaller than 
something” (184). Layer 7 integrates successive outputs from layer 6 and produces an object 
judgment. 
 To determine whether or not this model is a mechanism-sketch, we have to look at the 
extent to which it satisfies the 3M constraint. If the model is a mechanism-sketch, the 
systems and processes in the model required for extraction of geon structure, storage of geon 
structure, and comparison of geon structures must to some extent correspond to (perhaps 
distributed) components in the actual object recognition mechanism(s) in the brain. Is this the 
case? 
 This model was built, not merely to produce the same behavior as humans in object 
recognition tasks, but to model something that happens in human brains. Biederman et al. 
write, “We have concentrated on modeling primal access: The initial activation in a human 
brain of a basic-level representation of an image from an object exemplar, even a novel one, 
in the absence of any context that might reduce the set of possible objects” (Biederman, 
Cooper, Hummel and Fiser 1993, 176). Accordingly, Biederman and others have conducted 
various neuroimaging studies to investigate the neural underpinnings of the model.  
If Biederman's model is correct, there is an area or configuration of areas in the brain 
where simple parts and non-accidental properties are represented. In one study (Hayworth 
and Biederman 2006), subjects were shown line drawings that were either local feature 
deleted (LFD), in which every other vertex and line was deleted from each part, removing 
half the contour, or part deleted (PD) in which half of the parts were removed. On each 
  
experimental run, subjects saw either LFD or PD stimuli presented as a sequential pair and 
had to respond whether or not the exemplars were the same or different. The second stimulus 
was always mirror-reversed with respect to the first. Each run was comprised of an equal 
number of three conditions: Identical, Complementary, and Different Exemplar. In the 
Identical condition, the second stimulus was the same as the first stimulus (mirror-reversed, 
as all of the second stimuli were). In the Complementary condition, the second stimulus was 
the complement of the first, where an LFD-complement is composed of the deleted contour 
of the first and a PD-complement is composed of the deleted parts of the first. In the 
Different Exemplar condition, the second stimulus is a line-drawing of a different exemplar 
than the first. 
 An fMRI-adaptation design was used, which “relies on the assumption that neural 
adaptation reduces activity when two successive stimuli activate the same subpopulation but 
not when they stimulate different subpopulations” (Krekelberg, Boynton, van Wezel 2006, 
250; see also Kourtzi and Grill-Spector 2005). The results of the study showed adaptation 
between LFD complements and lack of adaptation between PD complements in lateral 
occipital complex, especially the posterior fusiform area, an area known to be involved in 
object recognition. These results imply that this area is “representing the parts of an object, 
rather than local features, templates, or object concepts” (Hayworth and Biederman 2006, 
4029).  
 It is true that JIM has properties that do not and could not correspond to anything in 
the brain. Weiskopf (2011, 331) mentions JIM’s “Fast Enabling Links” (FELs), which allow 
  
the model to bind representations and which have infinite propagation speed. According to 
Weiskopf, FELs are an example of fictionalization, “putting components into a model that are 
known not to correspond to any element of the modeled system, but which serve an essential 
role in getting the model to operate correctly” (Ibid.), and he argues that this undermines the 
claim that JIM is a mechanism-sketch. Weiskopf is right that FELs are an essential 
fictionalization, but playing an essential role in getting a model to operate is not the same as 
explaining; these parts of the model carry no explanatory information. Right now they play 
the black box role of whatever-it-is-that-accounts-for-binding. In addition to playing a black 
box role, they serve practical and epistemic purposes like the ones discussed by Bogen 
(2005), such as suggesting, constraining, and sharpening questions about mechanisms. Let 
me explain how by comparing FELs to Bogen’s example of the GHK equations.  
The Goldman, Hodgkin, and Katz (GHK) voltage and current equations are used to 
determine the reversal potential across a cell’s membrane and the current across the 
membrane carried by an ion. These equations rely on the incorrect assumptions that each ion 
channel is homogeneous and that interactions among ions do not influence their rate (Bogen 
409). About the inadequacy of these equations Bogen writes, 
While some generalizations are useful because they deliver empirically acceptable 
quantitative approximations, others are useful because they do not… Investigators 
used these and other GHK equation failures as problems to be solved by finding out 
more about how ion channels work. Fine-grained descriptions of exceptions to the 
  
GHK equations and the conditions under which they occur sharpened the problems 
and provided hints about how to approach them. (Bogen 410) 
The GHK equations provide a case of “using incorrect generalizations to articulate and 
develop mechanistic explanations” (Bogen 409). I argue that something similar can be said 
about FELs. Not only do FELs play an essential black box role, FELs suggest new questions 
about mechanisms, new problems to be solved. For example, Hummel and Biederman (1992) 
write, 
[T]he independence of FELs and standard excitatory-inhibitory connections in JIM 
has important computational consequences. Specifically, this independence allows 
JIM to treat the constraints on feature linking (by synchrony) separately from the 
constraints on property inference (by excitation and inhibition). That is, cells can 
phase lock without influencing one another’s level of activity and vice versa. 
Although it remains an open question whether a neuroanatomical analog of FELs will 
be found to exist, we suggest that the distinction between feature linking and property 
inference is likely to remain an important one. (510) 
Like the GHK equations, FELs suggest new lines of investigation, in this case regarding the 
relation between feature linking, property inference, and their neural mechanisms. 
Specifically, FELs suggest questions such as, “Can biological neurons phase lock without 
influencing one another’s activity?” and “Are there other ways biological neurons could 
implement feature linking and property inference independently?”. 
4. Model-Based fMRI 
  
 Model-based fMRI is a neuroimaging method that aims to discover the neural 
mechanisms that correspond to model variables. Model-based fMRI “can be used as a means 
of discriminating between competing computational models of cognitive and neural function. 
Thus, model-based fMRI provides insight into 'how' a particular cognitive function might be 
implemented in the brain, not only 'where' it is implemented” (O' Doherty, Hampton, and 
Kim 39).5 Given the 3M constraint, model-based fMRI can help us demarcate mechanistic 
from non-mechanistic models. 
 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a neuroimaging method that 
provides an indirect measure of neuronal activity. Neuronal activity requires glucose and 
oxygen for fuel, which the vascular system provides. The oxygen is bound to hemoglobin 
molecules and the magnetic properties of deoxygenated hemoglobin are detectable by this 
neuroimaging method. In this way, fMRI measures a physiological indicator of oxygen 
consumption – deoxyhemoglobin concentration – that correlates with changes in neuronal 
activity (Huettel, Song, and McCarthy 159-160). 
 To conduct a model-based fMRI analysis, one starts with a computational model that 
describes the function(s) by which stimuli are transformed to result in behavioral output. 
Stimulus input and behavioral output are observable, but the computational model postulates 
                                                 
5 Weiskopf (2011, 334) worries that allowing mechanisms to include distributed components 
will make identifying them more difficult. Model-based neuroimaging techniques allay this 
worry. 
  
internal variables linking input and output. The neural correlates of these internal variables 
can then be located using regression analyses (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 36).  
 I will illustrate how this works using the Rescorla-Wagner model of classical 
conditioning. In classical conditioning, an unconditioned stimulus, such as food, elicits an 
unconditioned response, such as salivation. After a neutral stimulus, such as a bell, becomes 
correlated6 with the unconditioned stimulus, the neutral stimulus (now called the conditioned 
stimulus) elicits a response (called the conditioned response) similar to the unconditioned 
response.  
 The Rescorla-Wagner model of classical conditioning can be represented with the 
following equations: 
Vn+1 = Vn + ad  
d = u - v 
where v represents the value of the conditioned stimulus and u represents the value of the 
unconditioned stimulus. Conditioning occurs as the value of v converges toward the value of 
u. On the Rescorla-Wagner model, this occurs as the value of v is updated in proportion to a 
prediction error d (the difference between u and v) on each trial, with a being the learning 
                                                 
6 This requires the caveat that the conditioned response (CR) is not already conditioned to a 
different conditioned stimulus (CS) that is present. Otherwise, conditioning of the CR to the 
first stimulus will be “blocked” by the second CS. For example, if a light is already a CS that 
elicits salivation, pairing a bell with the light will not make the bell a CS. 
  
rate used to scale the updates to v.  The value of a is calculated by simply finding the best fit 
to the behavioral data (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 37).  
 The two variables that change from trial to trial, v and d, are converted into a time 
series of the model-predicted BOLD (blood-oxygen-level dependent) response and then 
convolved with a canonical hemodynamic response function. This just means that the 
predicted values of v and d, taken over time, are mathematically combined with a 
stereotypical BOLD signal function. This is done to account for the usual lag in the 
hemodynamic response (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 37). This yields a new function 
which, when put into a general linear model, can be regressed against fMRI data. General 
linear models have the following form:  
y = B0 + B1 x1 + B2 x2 + … + Bn xn + e 
where y is the observed data, the xi are regressors (the model-predicted time series), the Bi are 
variable weights (B0 represents the contribution of factors held constant throughout the 
experiment), and e is residual noise in the data (Huettel, Song, and McCarthy 343). This 
allows researchers to identify brain areas where the model-predicted time series significantly 
correlates with the observed BOLD signal changes over time. 
 I should make clear that model-based fMRI has limitations and does not obviate the 
need for other neuroimaging methods (e.g., PET, EEG, or MEG). Like fMRI in general, 
model-based fMRI can only establish correlations between neural activity and behavior. In 
order to establish causal claims about neural activity and behavior, the same methods need to 
be used that were used before the introduction of model-based fMRI, such as lesioning and 
  
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) (O' Doherty, Hampton, and Kim 50). Like fMRI in 
general, model-based fMRI also has poor spatiotemporal resolution. This means that small 
computational signals such as those at the level of the single neuron will go undetected by 
model-based fMRI. For these reasons, a model-based approach to other neuroimaging 
methods is needed (Ibid.) 
5. SUSTAIN and ALCOVE as Mechanism-Sketches  
Now that we have a basic understanding of how model-based fMRI works and what it 
can accomplish, let me return to SUSTAIN and ALCOVE and show how they are 
mechanism-sketches by drawing on model-based fMRI research. The Attention Learning 
Covering map (ALCOVE) is a 3-layer, feed-forward, neural network model of object 
categorization (Kruschke 1992). A perceived stimulus is represented as a point in a multi-
dimensional psychological space with each input node representing a single, continuous 
psychological dimension. For example, a node may represent perceived size, in which case 
the greater the perceived size of a stimulus, the greater the activation of that node. Each node 
is modulated by an attentional gate whose strength reflects the relevance of that dimension 
for the categorization task. Each hidden node represents an exemplar and is activated in 
proportion to the psychological similarity of the input stimulus to the exemplar. Output nodes 
represent category responses and are activated by summing hidden nodes and multiplying by 
the corresponding weights. 
 The Supervised and Unsupervised Stratified Adaptive Incremental Network 
(SUSTAIN) is a network model of object categorization similar to ALCOVE (Love, Medin, 
  
and Gureckis 2004). Its input nodes also represent a multidimensional psychological space, 
but they can take continuous and discrete values, including category labels. Like ALCOVE, 
inputs are modulated by an attentional gate. Unlike ALCOVE, the next layer consists of a set 
of clusters associated with a category. All the clusters compete to respond, with inhibitory 
connections between each cluster, and the cluster closest to the stimulus in the 
multidimensional space is the winner. The cluster that wins activates the output unit 
predicting the category label. The output leads to a decision procedure that generates a 
category response.  
Both models were investigated in a model-based fMRI study (Davis, Love, and 
Preston 2012). In this study, participants completed a rule-plus-exception category learning 
task. During the task, a schematic beetle was presented and subjects were asked to classify it 
as “Hole A” or “Hole B,” after which they received feedback. The beetles varied on four of 
the following five attributes, with the fifth held constant: eyes (green or red), tail (oval or 
triangular), legs (thin or thick), antennae (spindly or fuzzy), and fangs (pointy or round). Six 
of the eight beetles presented could be correctly categorized on the basis of a single attribute. 
For example, three out of four Hole A beetles might have thick legs and three out of four 
Hole B beetles could have thin legs. The other beetles were exceptions to the rule, having 
legs that appeared to match the other category.  
 Two predictions from SUSTAIN and ALCOVE were tested. First, during stimulus 
presentation SUSTAIN predicts a recognition advantage for exceptions but ALCOVE 
predicts no recognition advantage. This is called the recognition strength measure. This 
  
difference in recognition strength measure predictions arises because in ALCOVE, but not in 
SUSTAIN, all items are stored individually in memory regardless of whether they are 
exceptions or rule-following items. Second, when subjects are given feedback, both 
SUSTAIN and ALCOVE predict that exceptions should lead to greater prediction error. This 
is called the error correction measure (Ibid., 263-4).  
 The results showed that the recognition strength measures and error correction 
measures predicted by SUSTAIN found correlations in MTL regions including bilateral 
hippocampus, parahippocampal cortex, and perirhinal cortex, and regions in bilateral 
hippocampus and perirhinal cortex, respectively. ALCOVE's predicted recognition strength 
measures did not find correlations in MTL, although its error correction predictions found 
correlations in MTL similar to SUSTAIN's (Ibid., 266-7). These correspondences to brain 
areas open a whole new range of opportunities for manipulation and provide answers to 
counterfactual questions that were not available before, thereby increasing the explanatory 
power of these models. 
  These results show that these SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches 
because they have varying degrees of correspondence to brain mechanisms. SUSTAIN is less 
sketchy than ALCOVE because both of SUSTAIN’s prediction measures were significantly 
correlated to areas of brain activation, whereas only one of ALCOVE’s was correlated. 
SUSTAIN, therefore, gets to move slightly up the continuum from mechanism-sketch to 
complete mechanistic model. These results also show that cognitive neuroscientists are 
currently advancing the ability to map the entities and activities in psychological models to 
  
distributed neural systems, such as MTL regions spanning bilateral hippocampus, 
parahippocampal cortex, and perirhinal cortex.  
Davis, Love, and Preston (2012) are at times quite explicit about the mechanistic 
nature of the models they are investigating, although they do not use the term “mechanistic.” 
For instance, they write, “The theory we forward relating SUSTAIN to the MTL…goes 
beyond the model’s equations by tying model operations to brain regions” (270). Given their 
emphasis on mapping models to the brain, it is clear that they intend the models to be 
mechanistic. Of course, this does not show that the models are in fact mechanistic. Modelers 
can intend that the model variables and relations between them correspond to features of the 
world and be wrong. Similarly, variables that are not intended to correspond to anything in 
the world could turn out to correspond. The model-based fMRI results presented above 
indicate that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are, in fact, sketches of mechanisms, though sketchy 
to different degrees.  
6. Conclusion 
 Weiskopf (2011) presented three models of object recognition and categorization, 
JIM, ALCOVE, and SUSTAIN, that he claimed were non-mechanistic, yet explanatory. He 
argued that they were not mechanistic because their parts could not be neatly localized and 
they contained some components, such as Fast Enabling Links (FELs), which could not 
correspond to anything in the brain but are nevertheless essential for the proper working of 
the model. I argued on the contrary that these models are mechanism-sketches. In addition to 
  
playing a black box role, FELs possess non-explanatory virtues such as suggesting new lines 
of investigation about feature linking and property inference.  
My argument for the claim that SUSTAIN and ALCOVE are mechanism-sketches 
relied on model-based fMRI research. Model-based fMRI and other model-based 
neuroimaging approaches are beginning to allow cognitive neuroscientists to map 
psychological models onto the brain. The development of these model-based approaches has 
broader implications, beyond the narrow dispute over JIM, SUSTAIN, and ALCOVE, for the 
debate over the explanatory and mechanistic status of psychological models. As cognitive 
neuroscientists continue to test psychological models against neuroimaging data using 
model-based techniques, they will retain those models that find correspondences in the brain 
and reject those that do not, and in so doing reveal that explanatory progress in cognitive 
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